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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
—000O000—

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STEVEN VAN DEN EIKHOF,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

VISTA SCHOOL, A UTAH PUBLIC
CHARTER SCHOOL,

Appeal No. 20110037

Defendant/Appellee.
—000O000—

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78A-3-102 and §78A-3-103.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue Number 1: Whether or not the trial court erred in deeming unanswered
admissions as admitted when the method of service was at issue.
Issue Number 2: Whether or not the trial court erred in deeming unanswered
admissions as admitted when the admissions improperly sought admissions to legal
conclusions.
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Issue Number 3: Whether or not the trial court erred because it failed to recognize
the legal effect of the admissions admitted in that said admissions were not determinative.
Issue Number 4: Whether or not the trial court erred in denying Appellant's
Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions.
Issue Number 5: Whether or not the trial court erred in striking Appellant's
Affidavit in Support of its opposition to Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Issue Number 6: Whether or not the trial court erred in granting Appellee's
Motion for Summary Judgment.
PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES AT ISSUE
The relevant portions of the Utah Code and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
included in an Addendum hereto include:
1.

URCP 5 (b)(l)(A)(ii); and

2.

URCP 56(c).

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the Order and Judgment of the Fifth District Court,
Washington County, granting Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment and an unfiled
Motion to Deem Admissions as Admitted. This is an action pursuant to Breach of
Contract, Negligent Misrepresentation, Fraud, and Fraud in the Inducement; seeking
compensation for an offer of employment that was sent to the Appellant to be employed,
as a teacher at the Appellee's school and then later revoked and offered at a significantly
lower amount.
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The trial court found, over objection of Appellant's counsel that propounded
discovery had been properly served, deemed Appellant's admissions as admitted, and
then granted summary judgment for the Appellee based on those admissions.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Background
On or about April 29, 2009 Appellant, Steven Van Den Eikhof, received an Offer
of Employment in writing from Appellee, Vista School, a Utah Public Charter School
(Vista) signed by Steven H. Goodman (Goodman), Principal of Vista. The "base salary"
(Addendum Number 4) in the original offer sent by the Appellee to the Appellant was for
$34,622.00. The offer also mentioned a benefits and a retirement package in addition to
the base salary mentioned. Appellee instructed Appellant to sign the offer if he accepted
same and return the signed offer to Vista by May 1, 2009. Appellant signed the offer and
delivered it as instructed, hereby accepting the offer on May 1, 2009.
Appellant also completed all other "requirements" (if any existed) for acceptance
of employment such as providing a copy of his teaching certificate; proof of legal
citizenship; and the passing of a criminal background check. At the behest of Vista,
Appellant also attended teacher training observations in California in June of 2009 and
teacher training in August of 2009.
Appellant planned to start the fall school year with Vista School as a teacher
relying on the original contract terms, as agreed upon in May of that year. However,
Appellee sent Appellant (and all other Vista teachers) a new, and reduced, contract offer.
This new offer was seemingly sent at a strategic time, after the Washington County
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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School District had already begun the new school year, thus making it impossible for any
teacher to find other employment as a teacher in the area. Appellant was required to sign
this new agreement in order to continue employment with Vista.
The new contract offer had a base salary of $30,576.65 which was $4,045.35 less
than the original offer. (Addendum Number 5) In addition, other benefits were omitted.
Appellant refused to accept the new offer. The Appellant had left a school nearer his
home in order to make more money as offered in the original offer of employment. In
reality, the new, reduced offer was lower than the job from which Appellant was
recruited. Appellant hired an attorney to negotiate with the principal of the school. At the
negotiation, it was determined that Appellant was constructively terminated from his
position with Vista due to his failure to accept the reduced offer.
Procedural Facts
On May 19, 2011, Appellee sent an email to Appellant stating that discovery
requests were attached and that the "originals" would follow in the mail. (Addendum
Number 6) Appellant filed the email electronically, virtually ignoring it, due to the fact
that actual service of the documents was supposed to be imminent. In addition, no
agreement had been reached in regard to service by email and Appellant logically
assumed that the email was a "heads up" or a courtesy.
Apparently, Appellee's secretary signed a Certificate of Service alleging that the
discovery "originals" were sent on May 20, 2011. Whether due to a mistake by this
secretary or by the postal service, these discovery papers never arrived at the office of
Appellant's counsel.
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Appellant received a Motion for Summary Judgment wherein counsel for Appellee
included a statement: "Accordingly [due to the Appellant's failure to answer admissions],
the following facts from Vista's Requests for Admissions are conclusively deemed
admitted." (Addendum Number 7, Pg. 2) Appellant's counsel immediately called
Appellee's counsel to inform him of the mistake in service of the original propounded
discovery and to request time to answer. Defense counsel refused to extend any time to
answer the improperly served discovery or to acknowledge that a mistake might have
been made by his office or the post office.
Appellant's counsel filed the appropriate motions to amend or withdraw as well as
an opposition memorandum to the Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial court was
visually upset with the arguments by Appellant and stated three times in open court that
Appellant's counsel had used "unprofessional" language. (Addendum Number 8: Pg. 9,
Line 24; Pg. 12, Line 7; and Pg. 12, Line 21). The judge then deemed all admissions as
admitted, struck Appellee's affidavit in support of its opposition to the Summary
Judgment, and granted Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment despite the fact that a
clear contract had been formed with the self-labeled "offer of employment" and
subsequent acceptance.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Deeming Admissions as Admitted: Inadequate Service (Issue One)
First and foremost, the Appellee never filed a Motion to Deem Admissions as
Admitted with the trial court. (Addendum Number 9)
Appellee claims to have served discovery requests via email and First Class Mail.
The trial court judge stated from the bench that email was good service (Addendum
Number 8, Pg. 11, Lines 16-17). Although Appellant freely admitted at the trial court
level that the email had been received, there was never any argument that the parties had
agreed to service by email. Furthermore, the email clearly stated that "originals" would
follow in the mail. Relying upon the wording in the email and not having agreed to
electronic service, as required by URCP 5 (b)(l)(A)(ii), Appellant electronically viewed a
settlement offer (attached to the same email) and then filed the email anticipating the
originals via mail. To this day, the discovery still has not arrived via mail.
Allowing Admissions that were Legal Conclusions (Issue Two)
Many of the admissions requested were not admissible according to case law.
Some of the requests were in complete contradiction to the offer of employment letter on
file with the court. Ironically, when the trial court judge was asked if he has seen the
letter in question, he replied that he had not. Regardless of whether or not the trial court
took this document into consideration, the fact of the matter is that the trial court should
have, as both parties admitted that Appellee had given to the Appellant the document and
that the Appellant had signed it in the place where it said :ACCEPTED AND AGREED".
Therefore, even if the trial court was correct in allowing the admissions and legal
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

<

conclusions, the trial court was incorrect in allowing the deemed admissions to overcome
the simple fact that a contractual document was on file with the court. In other words,
parties cannot "admit" that the four corners of a document are anything more or less than
the actual document shows within its four corners.
Trial Court's Failure to Recognize the Legal Effect of Deeming Admissions as
Non-Determinative (Issue Three)
Even if the trial court was correct in deeming the admissions as admitted and
every admission was "admittable" according to case law, the admissions were not
determinative enough to grant the Motion for Summary Judgment in light of the offer of
employment on file with the court.
Denial of Motion to Amend/Withdraw (Issue Four)
The trial court abused its discretion when it disallowed the Motion to Amend or
Withdraw. The Appellee argued the case of Langelandv. Monarch Motors, Inc., 952
P.2d 1058 (Utah 1998) citing the two-step process used to determine whether a request to
withdraw or amend admissions should be granted. The Appellant argues that this Motion
to Amend or Withdraw was solely about proper notice and service and therefore the twostep process was not applicable.
Striking Affidavit in Support (Issue Five)
The trial court then struck an affidavit in support of the opposition to the Motion
for Summary Judgment. No finding was made or reason given for this other than the trial
court now felt that this opposition was moot in light of the admissions being deemed as
admitted.
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Granting Motion for Summary Judgment (Issue Six)
The trial court granted the Motion for Summary Judgment based solely on the fact
that the admissions were deemed as admitted. Given the myriad of objections and
problems listed above, the granting of the Motion of Summary judgment would not have
happened "but for" the other errors. The admissions were simply not enough to overcome
the factual dispute of whether or not the document in question was an "offer of
employment" and therefore Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment should not have
been granted.
ARGUMENT
Issue Number 1: Inadequate Service
Whether or not the trial court erred in deeming unanswered admissions as
admitted when the method of service was at issue.
An email was sent from opposing counsel with attachments requesting discovery
i

on May 19, 2010. The email expressly stated that originals would follow in the mail.
(Addendum Number 6). Appellant's counsel viewed the settlement offer attached thereto
and then electronically filed the email from opposing counsel relying on the statement in
the email that the originals would follow in the mail. There were no requests or
agreements to accept service by email. Appellant did not calendar the time to answer the
discovery as the discovery had not yet been properly served. To this day, Appellant is
unaware as to whether the email files are even the same documents as the files that were
allegedly mailed. Had Appellant remembered that the email had come, he could have
called opposing counsel and asked for the originals, thus avoiding this entire appeal.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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However, that was not the case and Appellant's counsel had no duty to follow up with
opposing counsel regarding an email alluding to discovery that was never sent/received.
The originals were never properly served even though opposing counsel had a
Certificate of Service dated May 20, 2011. In fact, Appellant did not know that the
discovery was alleged to be served until counsel received Appellee's Motion for
Summary Judgment which stated therein that the Admissions were conclusively deemed
admitted. (Addendum Number 7, Pg. 2)
Defense counsel immediately contacted opposing counsel to discuss the service
issue and attempt to resolve it as no other deadlines had been missed on the case and it
was clearly an issue that could have been resolved with a simple extension of time.
Opposing counsel refused this simple request.
Despite no agreement that service could be effectuated via email, the trial court
held Appellant to a knowledge of service due to this email even though there was clearly
no agreement to accept electronic service. The hearing transcript (Addendum Number 8)
on page 11 states the following: "The evidence proves conclusively that the plaintiff
received the discovery request by e-mail, and the appellate courts have held that having
this notice of this sort, [sic] not specifically e-mail but clear actual notice that discovery
requests were present, gave the plaintiff a duty to respond in some way, to do something
other than just nothing." (Id. at Pg. 11, Lines 14-19).
This finding by the Court is clearly erroneous when coupled with the Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure URCP 5 (b)(l)(A)(ii) which restricts service via email to persons that
have "agreed to accept service by email".
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In regard to service by First Class Mail, the trial court judge found by a
"preponderance of the evidence... that defendant's discovery was served on plaintiffs
attorney by mail." (Id. at Pg. 11, Line 10) The judge further stated that the "evidence in
that regard is just much too clear to ignore." (Id. at Pg. 11, Lines 10-13) In actuality, the
only evidence presented was a Certificate of Service which had the May 20, 2010 date on
it. With Appellant's admitting that the email was sent and then stating that the discovery
had not been seen until the Motion for Summary Judgment had been filed, there was
more evidence to the contrary than "clear evidence" of service as referred to by Judge
Beacham. In fact, there was substantial argument to the contrary to the point that
Appellant's counsel was accused by the judge of being unprofessional when he typed in
the following in all capital letters: "Plaintiffs counsel knows for a fact that discovery was
not sent." Although the quote should properly read that Plaintiffs counsel knows that
discovery was not received, the point remains.
The Judge was later told by Appellant's counsel that the discovery attachments to
the email were never opened. The court responded that "I guess the answer why [one
should open those attachments] is the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have both
said, well, you know, if you knew there was discovery, you better do something about it.
It seems a little harsh rule to most of us, but that's what they said." (Id. at Pg. 17, Lines 711)
In reality, Appellant can locate no case wherein the Court of Appeals or the Utah
Supreme Court has ever held that a person is responsible to answer discovery propounded
by email absent an agreement to accept electronic service. There are attorneys that do not
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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even use email that practice all over the state of Utah and to find that discovery can be
sent in this fashion absent an agreement is clearly erroneous.
For a judge to impose summary judgment on a case where no motion or pleading
had heretofore gone unanswered and find that discovery had been sent when counsel
clearly had stated that he had not received it (other than in the email) is against the
overwhelming weight of the evidence.
Issue Number 2: Admission Requests for Legal Conclusions
Whether or not the trial court erred in deeming unanswered admissions as
admitted when the admissions improperly sought admissions to legal conclusions.
There were two admissions that called for legal conclusions and could not be
"admitted" by the Appellant. Furthermore, these admission requests, the form of which,
were addressed by the Utah Supreme Court in Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Or. Inc., 702
P.2d 98, 100 (Utah 1985) where the Court concluded that "'Admit you lose' type
requests, or requests to admit legal conclusions, are objectionable and not a proper basis
for admission." (Id. at 100).
The admissions in this case are attached hereto as Addendum Number 10.
Specifically, Appellant cites requests numbers 3 and 12:
"Admission No. 3: Please admit that the Vista Letter states
that it did not serve as a formal employment agreement."
"Admission No. 12: Please admit that the total amount of
compensation in the proposed Salary Agreement exceeded the
total amount of compensation state din the Vista Letter."
Admission number 3 is essentially the crux of the entire case—whether or not the
original offer of employment letter was actually an offer of employment as the letter
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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states. For some reason, Appellee has argued that this self-proclaimed document is not
what it purports to be. It is impossible for Appellant to "admit" that this legal document
(Addendum Number 4) is not a legal document and not an offer of employment. Note
that the first line of this letter clearly states that "I am pleased to extend you this offer of
employment." (Id.)
This request for admission is the exact type of admission contemplated by the
Supreme Court in Jensen where the Supreme Court held that even admissions that were
admitted due to a failure to respond sometimes need the court's intervention due to equity
concerns: "It is the last of these admissions that requires the intervention of this Court as
a matter of law." Jensen at 702 P.2d at 101.
Issue Number 3: Trial Court's Failure to Recognize the Legal Effect of Deeming

,

Admissions as Non-Determinative
Whether or not the trial court erred because it failed to recognize the legal effect of
the admissions admitted and conclusively established.
Even if the trial court was correct in constructively deeming the admissions as
admitted and every admission was "admittable" despite the holding in Jensen, the

i

admissions were not determinative enough to grant the Motion for Summary Judgment in
light of the offer of employment on file with the court.
i

The admissions admitted exactly 32 items. The admissions that seem to be
determinative for the issue of this appeal are the following:
Number 3: Admission that the Vista Letter States that it did not serve as a formal
employment agreement.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Number 5: Admission that the Vista Letter provides that Appellant had to sign a
Salary Agreement to formally accept employment from Vista School.
Number 9: Admission that the Vista Letter stated a base salary (emphasis added)
was $34,622 with no additional compensation listed.
Number 11: Admission that the proposed Salary Agreement [not the original
offer] provided for a salary of $35,626 after calculating for Educator Salary
Adjustments and compensation for professional development and training days.
If the Appellate Court finds that the trial court did not err by admitting these
admissions, Appellant alternatively argues that the trial court did err when it found that
the 32 admissions were dispositive. All of the above admissions could be true and the
Appellant's case remains a fact question for the trier of fact.
The "base salary" mentioned in admission number 9 and the total salary listed in
admission number 11 are not at odds with each other. When $35,626 was proposed, the
state had included (subsequent to the original agreement) the $2,000 Educator Salary
Adjustment that is paid by the state. In addition, the teachers were to receive $850 for the
"training days" that they had already completed and for which they had not yet been paid.
Thus, the subsequent offer was actually lower than the first offer as the Appellant has
always alleged. At a minimum, this is another fact question at issue.
The entire factual issue on this case revolved around two things:
1. Did an offer exist?
2. Did the subsequent offer match the first offer?
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For the trial court to find that there was no genuine issue of material fact, Judge
Beacham must have found that Appellant accepted an offer, went to training, and then
rejected a higher salary offer. Even if all of the admissions were admitted, the admissions
were not dispositive of the case and at least two issues of material fact still existed.
Issue Four: Denial of Motion to Amend/Withdraw
Whether or not the trial court erred in denying Appellant's Motion to Amend or
Withdraw Admissions.
The trial court abused its discretion when it disallowed the Motion to Amend or
Withdraw Admissions. Case law requires a two-step process to determine whether or not
a Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions should be granted. These steps are outlined
in Langelandv. Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1998):
In the first step, we review the trial court's determinations as
to whether amendment or withdrawal would serve the
presentation of the merits and whether amendment or
withdrawal would result in prejudice to the nonmoving party.
In the second step, we review the trial court's discretion to
grant or deny the motion. It is the finding of prejudice that
was missing at the trial court level.
The Appellee argues that Appellant should have addressed this "two pronged test"
specifically. The trial court held that "The Plaintiff failed to introduce evidence by
affidavit or otherwise of specific facts showing any admissions to be untrue."
In fact Appellant/Plaintiff did not address the admissions at all except to attempt to
argue that the admissions had never been properly served in the first place. While the
analysis in the Langeland case argued by Appellee would seem to show that Appellant
should have argued the two-pronged test, Appellant's motion was providing an argument
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that precedes any analysis required by Langeland and therefore, Appellant argues that
Langeland does not apply to a situation where the Admissions were admitted without
proper service to the opposing party.
Issue Five: Striking Affidavit in Support
Whether or not the trial court erred in striking Appellant's Affidavit in Support of
its opposition to Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment.
The trial court then struck an affidavit in support of the Opposition to the Motion
for Summary Judgment. The affidavit in support of the original opposition to Appellee's
Motion for Summary Judgment was inadvertently not filed with the court with the
original opposition. However, when Plaintiff/Appellant discovered this mistake, the
affidavit of the Appellant was filed with the court. The Appellee filed a Motion to Strike
based on the failure to file the affidavit with the original opposition paperwork.
The trial court agreed with Appellee and held the following: "That's improper in a
reply memorandum. The party's not allowed to meet its initial burden by waiting until
opposing counsel responds and then doing what was required in the first place."
(Addendum Number 8, Page 11, Lines 6-9)
In actuality, there is no case law that Appellant can find that addresses the late
filing of an affidavit in opposition to a Motion for Summary Judgment. The filing of this
affidavit after the fact did not prejudice or harm the Appellee, but simply reaffirmed to
the court that the facts outlined in the opposition were sworn to by the
Plaintiff/Appellant. The Appellee still had adequate notice and time to address the actual
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facts alleged in the opposition and the failure in regard to timing was merely harmless
error.
Regardless of the finding of the Appellate Court in regard to this affidavit, the
obvious factual dispute in this case cannot be overridden by the failure to timely file an
affidavit in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment.
Issue Six: Granting Motion for Summary Judgment
Whether or not the trial court erred in granting Appellee's Motion for Summary
Judgment due to the adequacy of the findings.
The trial court granted the Motion for Summary Judgment based on the fact that
the admissions were deemed as admitted and the response to the proposed Motion for
Summary Judgment lacked "any affidavit, any discovery or any other relevant materials."
(Addendum Number 8, Page 12, Lines 4-6).
The question for summary judgment is whether or not there exists any issue of
i

material fact (URCP § 56). The court held that "[n]o genuine issue of material fact
appears in regard to defendant's motion for summary judgment." (Addendum Number 8,
Page 12, Line 7-8) Ironically, the court also found in the same hearing that "the Court

<

could not possibly determine there are no genuine issues of material fact..." (Addendum
Number 8, Pg. 10, Lines 3-4) In fact, the two greatest issues of material fact still
i

remained—regardless of whether or not the Court was looking at the Plaintiff s or the
Defendant's paperwork. These issues revolved around the question of whether or not the
original offer of employment was an offer and whether or not the second offer of
employment was greater than or less than the first offer.
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It was very clear that Judge Beacham hold to a Motion for Summary Judgment
standard that is admittedly not in line with the Court of Appeals and that normally used
by other courts. In fact, the trial judge held that "The way that I apply summary judgment
is according to the rules as I read them. I understand that that's not going to be your
experience everywhere. In particular if you go to the Court of Appeals, heaven only
knows what their rules regarding summary judgment are... I don't know what the rules
are up there... I feel like if we're going to do that, then we've got to stick to that rule, and
that's where the appellate court decisions really bother me..." (Addendum Number 8,
Pages 18-19)
In other words, the trial judge clearly has his own method of determining what a
Motion for Summary Judgment and an Opposition to that motion should have in them.
The unfortunate fact is that most attorneys are far more familiar with the standards as
held in decades of case law where one issue of genuine fact defeats a Motion for
Summary Judgment instead of the procedural strategies that can be used in order to urge
courts to ignore material fact issues.
CONCLUSION
In this case, the two greatest issues before the court have still not been addressed:
1) Does a contract exist? and 2) did the subsequent salary agreement (second offer) from
Vista match the first offer of employment?
The admissions were never properly served in this case and the subsequent
findings of the trial court based on the finding that service was proper should all be
reversed and remanded back to the trial court.
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Because of this fact, Appellant asks the Appellate Court for the following:
1.

To reverse the decision of the trial court and find that service of the original
requests for admissions was not properly served by email;

2.

To reverse the decision of the trial court that the service was effectuated by
any other means;

3.

To reverse the decision of the trial court that the admissions are deemed
admitted;

4.

To reverse the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment in
favor of the Appellee;

5.

To reverse the decision of the trial court striking the Affidavit of Appellant
in Opposition to the Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment;

6.

To reverse the trial court's denial of the Appellant's Motion to Amend or
Withdraw Admissions; and

7.

To remand this case for further proceedings on the matters of the case
therein.

DATED t h i s ^ I day of June, 2011.

i

Respectfully Submitted,

BR^^T^DAMSON,
^fie Justice Firm Legal, LLC
Attorney for Appellant
(
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Rule 5. Service and filing of pleadings and other papers.
(a) Service: When required.
(a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in these rules or as otherwise directed by the court,
every judgment, every order required by its terms to be served, every pleading subsequent to
the original complaint, every paper relating to discovery, every written motion other than one
heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment, and similar
paper shall be served upon each of the parties.
(a)(2) No service need be made on parties in default except that:
(a)(2)(A) a party in default shall be served as ordered by the court;
(a)(2)(B) a party in default for any reason other than for failure to appear shall be served
with all pleadings and papers;
(a)(2)(C) a party in default for any reason shall be served with notice of any hearing
necessary to determine the amount of damages to be entered against the defaulting party;
(a)(2)(D) a party in default for any reason shall be served with notice of entry of judgment
under Rule 58A(d); and
(a)(2)(E) pleadings asserting new or additional claims for relief against a party in default
for any reason shall be served in the manner provided for service of summons in Rule 4.
(a)(3) In an action begun by seizure of property, in which no person is named as
defendant, any service required to be made prior to the filing of an answer, claim or
appearance shall be made upon the person having custody or possession of the property at
the time of its seizure.
(b) Service: How made.
(b)(1) If a party is represented by an attorney, service shall be made upon the attorney
unless service upon the party is ordered by the court. If an attorney has filed a Notice of
Limited Appearance under Rule 75 and the papers being served relate to a matter within the
scope of the Notice, service shall be made upon the attorney and the party.
(b)(1)(A) If a hearing is scheduled 5 days or less from the date of service, the party shall
use the method most likely to give prompt actual notice of the hearing. Otherwise, a party
shall serve a paper under this rule:
(b)(1)(A)(i) upon any person with an electronic filing account who is a party or attorney in
the case by submitting the paper for electronic filing;
(b)(1)(A)(ii) by sending it by email to the person's last known email address if that person
has agreed to accept service by email;
(b)(1)(A)(iii) by faxing it to the person's last known fax number if that person has agreed to
accept service by fax;
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(b)(1)(A)(iv) by mailing it to the person's last known address;
(b)(1)(A)(v) by handing it to the person;
(b)(1)(A)(vi) by leaving it at the person's office with a person in charge or leaving it in a
receptacle intended for receiving deliveries or in a conspicuous place; or
(b)(1)(A)(vii) by leaving it at the person's dwelling house or usual place of abode with a
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein.
(b)(1)(B) Service by mail, email or fax is complete upon sending. Service by electronic
means is not effective if the party making service learns that the attempted service did not
reach the person to be served.
(b)(2) Unless otherwise directed by the court:
(b)(2)(A) an order signed by the court and required by its terms to be served or a judgment
signed by the court shall be served by the party preparing it;
(b)(2)(B) every other pleading or paper required by this rule to be served shall be served
by the party preparing it; and
(b)(2)(C) an order or judgment prepared by the court shall be served by the court.
(c) Service: Numerous defendants. In any action in which there is an unusually large
number of defendants, the court, upon motion or of its own initiative, may order that service of
the pleadings of the defendants and replies thereto need not be made as between the
defendants and that any cross-claim, counterclaim, or matter constituting an avoidance or
affirmative defense contained therein shall be deemed to be denied or avoided by all other
parties and that the filing of any such pleading and service thereof upon the plaintiff
constitutes notice of it to the parties. A copy of every such order shall be served upon the
parties in such manner and form as the court directs.
(d) Filing. All papers after the complaint required to be served upon a party shall be filed
with the court either before or within a reasonable time after service. The papers shall be
accompanied by a certificate of service showing the date and manner of service completed by
the person effecting service. Rule 26(i) governs the filing of papers related to discovery.
(e) Filing with the court defined. A party may file with the clerk of court using any means of
delivery permitted by the court. The court may require parties to file electronically with an
electronic filing account. Filing is complete upon the earliest of acceptance by the electronic
filing system, the clerk of court or the judge. The filing date shall be noted on the paper.
Advisory Committee Notes
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Rule 3 6 . Request for admission.
(a) Request for admission.
(a)(1) A party may serve upon any other party a written request for the admission, for purpose of the pending action only, of the
truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) set forth in the request that relate to statements or opinions of fact or of the
application of law to fact, including the genuineness of any documents described in the request. The request for admission shall
contain a notice advising the party to whom the request is made that, pursuant to Rule 36, the matters shall be deemed admitted
unless said request is responded to within 30 days after service of the request or within such shorter or longer time as the court
may allow. Copies of documents shall be served with the request unless they have been or are otherwise furnished or made
available for inspection and copying. Without leave of court or written stipulation, requests for admission may not be served
before the time specified in Rule 26(d).
(a)(2) Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be separately set forth. The matter is admitted unless, within thirty
days after service of the request, or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow, the party to whom the request is
directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a written answer or objection addressed to the matter, signed by the
party or by his attorney, but, unless the court shortens the time, a defendant shall not be required to serve answers or objections
before the expiration of 45 days after service of the summons and complaint upon him. If objection is made, the reasons therefor
shall be stated. The answer shall specifically deny the matter or set forth in detail the reasons why the answering party cannot
truthfully admit or deny the matter. A denial shall fairly meet the substance of the requested admission, and when good faith
requires that a party qualify his answer or deny only a part of the matter of which an admission is requested, he shall specify so
much of it as is true and qualify or deny the remainder. An answering party may not give lack of information or knowledge as a
reason for failure to admit or deny unless he states that he has made reasonable inquiry and that the information known or readily
obtainable by him is insufficient to enable him to admit or deny. A party who considers that a matter of which an admission has
been requested presents a genuine issue for trial may not, on that ground alone, object to the request; he may, subject to the
provisions of Rule 37(c), deny the matter or set forth reasons why he cannot admit or deny it.
(a)(3) The party who has requested the admissions may move to determine the sufficiency of the answers or objections. Unless
the court determines that an objection is justified, it shall order that an answer be served. If the court determines that an answer
does not comply with the requirements of this rule, it may order either that the matter is admitted or that an amended answer be
served. The court may, in lieu of these orders, determine that final disposition of the request be made at a pretrial conference or
at a designated time prior to trial. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the
motion.
(b) Effect of admission. Any matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits
withdrawal or amendment of the admission. Subject to the provisions of Rule 16 governing amendment of a pretrial order, the
court may permit withdrawal or amendment when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the
party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice him in maintaining his
action or defense on the merits. Any admission made by a party under this rule is for the purpose of the pending action only and is
not an admission by him for any other purpose nor may it be used against him in any other proceeding.
Advisory Committee Notes
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Rule 5 6 . Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may,
at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary
judgment by the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is
sought, may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment
sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is
a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the
relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what
material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear
without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and
directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmiatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be
attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate,
shall be entered against a party failing to file such a response.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for
reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or
may make such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the
purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of the
reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
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VISTA
•/. mmmaam ;
Date: Wednesday, April 29, 2009
Steve Van Den Eikhof
3396 Sugar Leo Road
St George, Utah 84790
Dear Mr. Van Den Eikhof:
On behalf of Vista School, I am pleased to extend to you this offer of employment. This letter confirms your offer,
but does not serve as a formal employment agreement. Once you have fulfilled the conditions indicated below, you
will complete the actual hiring process and sign a "Salary Agreement" as well as the paperwork necessary for the
benefits described below.
Vista offers you abase salary of $34,622 per year. You will also be eligible for Ml benefits^ including group
medical benefits and to participate in Vista's retirement plan. Please contact Human Resources at # 435-632-6396
for more details about these plate.
In order for you to accept this offer, you will heed to provide the following items to Vista's Human Resources (via
e-mail to: sdbrook2@beyondbb.coni):
J3 For purposes of federal immigration law, you will be required to provide documentary evidence of your
identity and eligibility for employment in the United States.
J3 You are also required to provide us with evidence of your state teaching license, if applicable to your
position.
J3 All employees are also required to complete a criminal background check. (A copy of your current
teaching license will fulfill this requirement also.)
To assist us in protecting the*confidentiality of your agreement with Vista, we would request that you not disclose,
either directly or indirectly, any infoftnMfoh, including any of the terms of this letter regarding salary, to any
person, including other Vista employees, other than members of your immediate family and any legal, tax or
accounting specialists who provide you with individual legal, tax or accounting advice.
Your employment with Vista will be on ail "at will" basis. By signing and returning this letter, you indicate your
acceptance of this offer, your agreement to complete the required items above, and your agreement to complete the
paperwork necessary to formalize your employment with Vista School.
Please sign this letter and return it (via e-mail to: sdbrook2@bevondbb.com) by Friday, May 1,2009. We're
excited to invite you on board and hope you feel the same. 1 look forward to working with you.
Sincerely,

Steven H. Goodman - Principal, Vista School

ACCEPTED AND AGREED
-

^

^

Your Signaturp^
Date
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SALARY/WAGE AGREEMENT-^EACHEB.
SECTION ONE
PARTIES AND POLICIES
A.

This Salary/Wage Agreement ("Agreement") is between Steve Van Den Eikhof
("Employee") and Vista School ("School" or "Vista") a charter school located in
Washington County, Utah, during the period of the 2009-2010 school year. This
Agreement identifies the dollar amount Employee will be paid for work, and how
payment will be made. This Agreement does not represent a guarantee of work for the
entire period specified above.

B.

This Agreement represents the entire agreement regarding wages or salary between
Employee and Vista. This Agreement supersedes any other agreement, either written
or verbal. Vista is an at-will employer, and this Agreement should not be construed to
represent a contract. Either party to this Agreement may terminate the employment at
any time with or without notice, for any legal reason, or for no reason.

C.

Employee will follow School policies as outlined in the Employee Handbook, Policy
Manual, Job Description, written memos and emails, and any other documents and
policies that School has adopted or may adopt at any time. Vista may change policies
pertaining to Employee from time to time, but will never change its at-will
employment policy outlined in Part B above, and in the Employee Handbook.
SECTION TWO
ASSIGNMENT AND SCHEDULE

Employee will perform work as outlined in the Job description. By signing this Agreement,
Employee is also acknowledging receipt of the Job Description and agrees to perform work as
described in that document, and as directed by the School Director. This Agreement is in effect
only during Employee's proposed teaching assignment of 5th Grade Teacher, including
additional secondary assignments based on School's need as determined by School Director.
Employee will teach assigned classes on campus during the regular school day, and is
required to be on campus from 8:00 a.m. to 3:45 p.m. on school days, and on campus during
these additional times as scheduled by school administration:
•
•
•
•
•

Parent/Teacher Conferences
Up to 5 teacher training days
Occasional after school assemblies and/or activities related to grade(s)/subject(s)
taught
Regular student performances
As needed to meet with parents or school administration
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Employee will complete non-teaching tasks (preparation, correction, coordination, grading,
etc.) either on or off campus.
Employee is exempt from overtime pay, and may be regularly required to work extended
hours to complete work as outlined in the job description.
SECTION THREE
WAGES AND SALARY
For the work outlined in the Job Description, performed over 180 school days and up to 5
training days, Employee will be paid $30,576.65 in base salary, plus an additional $4,200 based
on legislative Educator Salary Adjustments, plus an additional $849.35 for attending professional
development and training days for total compensation of $35,626. Payments will be in amounts
equal to 1/12 of total compensation. If Employee's employment is terminated prior to the end of
the Agreement period, or if Employee is on unpaid leave at any time during the agreement
period, salary will be prorated proportionate to the number of days worked out of the 180
scheduled days, and the final, prorated payment will be made on the regular pay day for the pay
period that includes the date of termination or the beginning of unpaid leave.
SECTION FOUR.
OTHER. BENEFITS AND COMPENSATION
A.

Employees that are scheduled to work 30 or more hours per week during the school
year currently accrue personal leave as explained in the employee handbook. This
leave can be used to offset required teaching or on-campus time missed due to illness
or other personal reasons.

B.

Vista Employees who are scheduled to work 30 or more hours per week during the
school year are currently eligible for group health benefits. Refer tfc information in the
health benefits enrollment packet and the Employee Handbook for details.

C.

Employees age 21 or older are currently eligible to participate in Vista's retirement
program after 90 days of employment. Refer to the Retirement Program Booklet for
details and options.
SECTION FIVE
EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS CHECKOUT

Employee will use Vista's property, equipment, and materials in performing the duties associated
with Employee's job. Vista uses a documented checkout process to track its property, and
Employee is required to follow that process to receive foil compensation according to this
Agreement upon termination of employment, whether it may be at Employee's will or at the will
of the School. If Employee does not participate in this process or if School items checked out to
Employee are missing or damaged at this checkout, School may deduct replacement, repair costs
and/or cleaning fees from Employee's compensation.
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SECTION SIX
CONFIDENTIALITY
The terms of this agreement are confidential between Employee and Vista. Neither party shall
discuss the terms of this agreement with other Vista employees or other parties that do not, by
Vista's definition, have a business need to know. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Vista will
provide information related to educator salaries as required by law.
SECTION SEVEN
ATTEST
Vista is an at-will employer. This Agreement should not be construed to represent a contract.
Either party to this Agreement may terminate the employment at any time with or without notice,
for any legal reason, or for no reason. Neither party shall have any claim for wages or services
beyond the termination date.
This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the parties with regard to salary or
wages. This Agreement supersedes any other agreement regarding salary or wages, either
written or verbal.
If any portion of this Agreement is deemed by a court of competent jurisdiction to be
nonbinding, it shall not affect any other portion of said Agreement.
The parties below understand and agree to the above.

[Employee]

[Phone]

[Date]

[Address]

[Vista Officer's Signature]

[Title]
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[Date]
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Steven Van Den Eikhof v. Vista School
5 messages
Gregory Hardman <GHardman@snowjensen.com>
To: Bryan Adamson <badamson@dixielegal.com>
Cc: Gregory Hardman <GHardman@snowjensen.com>

Wed, May 19, 2010 at 5:20 PM

Bryan, please see attached PDF documents pertaining to the Van Den Eikhof case. The originals will follow in
the mail. Thank you.

J. Gregory Hardman
SNOW JENSEN & REECE
Tonaquint Business Park, Building B
912 West 1600 South, Suite 200
St. George, UT 84770
Office: (435) 628-3688
Direct Dial: (435)215-4547

5 attachments
m\ 5.19.2010SettlementLetter.pdf

m 51K
« U.R.C.P. 68 Settlement Offer.pdf
Id 28K
A

Certificate of Service - U.R.C.P. 68 Settlement Offer.pdf

m22KDefendant's First Set of Discovery Requests.pdf
19 406K

Certificate of Service - Defendant's First Set of Discovery Requests.pdf

19 25K

Bryan Adamson <badamson@dixielegal.com>
To: Gregory Hardman <GHardman@snowjensen.com>

Fri, May 21, 2010 at 11:35 AM

Sorry Greg. This is far too low. If you can triple this, we can get a deal done.
They have to know at this point that they are totally screwed on the breach of contract claim. That claim alone
Digitized
the Howard
W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
is worth quite a bit more
thanby$7k
and change.
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Anyway, thanks for the offer. Talk to you soon.
Bryan
[Quoted text hidden]

Bryan T. Adamson,
Attorney at Law
The Justice Firm, LLC
205 E. Tabernacle, Suite 2
St. George, UT 84790
(435) 986-8386 [office]
(435) 628-7844 [facsimile]
Gregory Hardman <GHardman@snowjensen.com>
To: Bryan Adamson <badamson@dixielegal.com>
Cc: Gregory Hardman <GHardman@snowjensen.com>

Fri, May 21, 2010 at 12:19 PM

Bryan:

If you are saying by your email below that your client is unwilling to settle for less than $20,000, I suspect the
School will want to proceed with the litigation. I respectfully disagree with your assessment of the contract
claim. The "offer letter" suggested by its terms that the amounts of compensation and benefits were
unresolved issues and your client's several emails and discussions with School personnel thereafter suggest
that your client likewise held this understanding. If so, there was never a meeting of the minds sufficient to
form a contract.

Nonetheless, I will have forwarded your email to the School's Board of Directors and will let you know how they
want to proceed. Perhaps we will have to go through some discovery before the evidence will develop to the
point where we can clarify some of these disputed factual and legal issues.

Thanks.

J. Gregory Hardman
SNOW JENSEN & REECE
Tonaquint Business Park, Building B
912 West 1600 South, Suite 200
St. George, UT 84770
Office: (435) 628-3688
Direct Dial: (435)215-4547
From: Bryan Adamson rmailto:badamson@dixieleqal.coml
by the Howard
Sent: Friday, May 21, Digitized
2010 11:36
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To: Gregory Hardman
Subject: Re: Steven Van Den Eikhof v. Vista School
[Quoted text hidden]

Bryan Adamson <badamson@dixielegal.com>
To: Gregory Hardman <GHardman@snowjensen.com>

Fri, May 21, 2010 at 2:00 PM

Greg,
That is correct. My client will not settle for less than $20,000. I think you all need to seriously consider the
wake of destruction left by Goodman. I assume you know he is no longer working there and no longer has an
incentive to fabricate what he did. The offer letter had the terms in it and my client just wanted to find out if the
state had ponied up their $4,200 or not. There had been an offer (or an offer to offer) as well as acceptance.
Even if my client was not informed enough to understand the offer, the meeting of the minds had already taken
place. You cannot undo a signed contract with later confusion.
I will be submitting an MSJ on the contract issue next week. Maybe that will let the school know where they
stand a little better. Besides we both know that $20k is not much more than they will pay to defend this
anyway.
Let me know.
Bryan
[Quoted text hidden]

Bryan Adamson <badamson@dixielegal.com>
To: Gregory Hardman <GHardman@snowjensen.com>

Wed, Jun 2, 2010 at 3:22 PM

Greg,
My client just got hired on with the District for next year. Since he missed a year due to Vista, he is again
considered a first year teacher. This is a loss in wages to him of over $30,000 over the years to come.
In addition, we just found another teacher who is very unhappy with Vista and Steve Goodman. She had been
told by Steve Goodman that if she would help develop the fine arts curriculum that he would hire her. Of
course, she completed her portion of the work and they used her curriculum, but they refused to hire her.
I don't think the school board realizes what they are getting into with this. If this thing goes to trial and they
lose, they can expect a dozen or more suits to follow right on the heals of this one.
Just a thought.
Bryan
[Quoted text hidden]
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a COPY
SNOW JENSEN & REECE
J. Gregory Hardman [8200]
Tyson C Horrocks [12557]
Tonaquint Business Park, Bldg. B
1600 South 912 West, Suite 200
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone (435) 628-3688
Facsimile (435) 628-3275
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STEVEN VAN DEN EIKHOF,

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
v.
VISTA SCHOOL, A UTAH PUBLIC
CHARTER SCHOOL,
Defendant.

Civil No.: 090503847
Judge G. Rand Beacham

Defendant Vista School, a Utah Public Charter School (hereinafter '"Defendant"), by and
through its counsel of record, J. Gregory Hardman and the law firm of Snow Jensen & Reece,
and pursuant to Rules 7 and 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby submits its Reply
Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment.
PRELIMINARY ARGUMENT
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, in pertinent part, as follows:
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The motion, memorandum and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The
judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law (emphasis added).
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure further states, in pertinent part, as follows:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of
the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to
file such a response (emphasis added).
Examination of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment demonstrates that every
assertion of an undisputed material fact was supported in accordance with Rule 56(c) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, the Affidavit of J. Gregory Hardman in Support of
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment sets forth an explanation as to the timing and
sequence for the filing of Defendant's First Set of Requests for Admissions, Interrogatories and
Requests for Production of Documents (hereinafter "Defendant's First Discovery Request") and
attached thereto and incorporated by reference copies of Defendant's First Discovery Request
(Aff. Hardman, Ex. 1) and the corresponding Certificate of Discovery (Aff. Hardman, Ex. 2).
Therefore, each of the deemed admitted Requests for Admissions then became undisputed
material facts that Plaintiff had an obligation to oppose by affidavit or as otherwise provided by
Rules 56(c) and (e).
Conversely, examination of Plaintiff s Memorandum in Response to Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Plaintiffs Opposition Memo") reveals that it is not
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supported by any affidavits, references to Defendant's pleadings, or any other form of evidence
required under Rule 56(c) to properly oppose a motion for summary judgment.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that once the moving party on a motion for
summary judgment has properly established "a prima facie case for summary judgment," the
opponent of the motion "must file responsive affidavits raising factual issues, or risk the trial
court's conclusion that there are no factual issues." Franklin Fin. v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659
P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1984); see also Bush Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 743 P.2d
1217, 1219 (Utah 1987).
Since Plaintiffs Opposition Memo is facially defective, the Court may properly disregard
Plaintiffs "Facts in Dispute" and enter summary judgment in favor of Defendant because the
Affidavit of J. Gregory Hardman in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
(inclusive of its citations to the deemed admitted Requests for Admissions) establishes a prima

<

facie case for summary judgment.
The language of Rule 56(e) is clear:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this
Rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this Rule,
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he
does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered
against him.
Franklin Fin., 659 P.2d at 1044 (emphasis added).

\
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RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S "FACTS IN DISPUTE"
As explained above, Plaintiffs "Facts in Dispute" must be entirely disregarded
because they are not properly supported as required by Rules 56(c) and (e). However,
since the principal assertion within Plaintiffs "Facts in Dispute" is actually a legal
argument—namely, that Defendant's First Discovery Request was "never properly
served"—Defendant will respond to the contentions underpinning Plaintiffs argument.
First, Plaintiff (specifically Plaintiffs counsel) acknowledges having received the
May 19, 2010 email from Defendant's counsel to which was attached Defendant's First
Discovery Request. Utah courts have held that "actual notice of discovery requests is
sufficient to invoke" [an obligation to make a timely response]. Aurora Credit Serv., Inc.
v. Liberty WestDev., Inc., 2006 UT App 48, ^4, 129 P.3d 287 (citing Morgan v.
Continental Banking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 275 (Utah 1997) (affirming the trial court's
dismissal of plaintiff s claims under mle 37 where plaintiff "admitted that he received the
discovery requests as well as the motion to compel" because it was "disingenuous for
[plaintiff] to ... argue that he was not aware of his obligation to respond"); Utah Dep 't
Tramp, v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 8 (Utah 1995) (affirming default judgment against
defendant under rule 37, even though defendant denied receiving some of the discovery
motions, because defendant "was given ample notice of the proceedings against him and
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his obligations under the law5')). Thus, Plaintiffs contention that email notice was an
insufficient form of service is misplaced.
Second, Plaintiff suggests, and specifically states elsewhere in his brief without
citation to any legal authority, that Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure prohibits
service by email. Rule 5 says no such thing. In fact, Rule 5(b) specifically provides as
follows regarding service by email:
If a party is represented by an attorney service shall be made upon the attorney
unless service upon the party is ordered by the court. [....] Otherwise, a party
shall serve a paper under this rule: upon any person with an electronic filing
account who is a party or attorney in the case by submitting the paper for
electronic filing: by sending it by email to the person's last known email address
if that person has agreed to accept service by email; ...
Defendant acknowledges that Rule 5(b)(l)(A)(ii) requires some sort of an agreement to accept
service in this format; however, the rule itself is silent as to any special form the agreement must
take,2 Plaintiffs counsel's email, dated May 21, 2010 at 11:3 6 AM, which is attached to the
Affidavit of J. Gregory Hardman in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions, was a direct
response to Defendant's counsel's May 19, 2010 email to which was attached Defendant's First
Discovery Request. Throughout the entirety of these proceedings the parties' counsel have
communicated via email. In fact, Plaintiffs counsel's May 21 email contains a specific response
1

Defendant strongly disputes Plaintiffs contention that Defendant's First Discovery Request was not properly
served by regular U.S. Mail as indicated in the corresponding Certificate of Discovery. As set forth in the Affidavit
of J. Gregory Hardman in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions, a courtesy copy of which is attached
hereto, all inferences regarding service of Defendant's First Discovery Request must be resolved in Defendant's
favor for the following reasons: (1) Plaintiff failed to properly oppose by affidavit the factual assertion in the
Affidavit of J. Gregory Hardman in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment that service was proper;
and (2) all of the documentary evidence attached to the Affidavit of J. Gregor}' Hardman in Opposition to Plaintiffs
Motion for Sanctions strongly suggests there was proper sendee by U.S. Mail.
2
The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 5 state: "While it is not necessary to file the written consent with the court,
it would be advisable to have the consent in the form of a stipulation suitable for filing and to file it with the court."
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and rejection of Defendant's U.R.C.P. 68 Settlement Offer, which was also attached to
Defendant's counsel's May 19 email along with a transmittal letter also dated May 19, 2010,
which, among other things, stated:
Lastly, I have also enclosed herewith Defendant's First Set of Requests for
Admissions, Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents and a
copy of the corresponding Certificate of Discovery, which original Certificate of
Discovery is now on file with the Court. In an effort to move this matter along,
the Vista School Board requested that I propound these discovery requests, should
your client decline Vista School's U.R.C.P. 68 Settlement Offer (emphasis
added).
See Aff. J. Gregory Hardman in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions, % 13 and Exhibit
2, p. 2, attached thereto.
ARGUMENT
In the Argument section of Plaintiff s Opposition Memorandum, Plaintiff first contends
that Defendant's First Discovery Request was improperly served. This argument has been
refuted above,
Plaintiff next cites U.R.C.P. 26(g) and then suggests that Defendant should be sanctioned
for refusing to withdraw its Motion for Summary Judgment. Since Plaintiff has also filed a
Motion for Sanctions, Defendant will respond to the specific arguments in said motion.
Thirdly, Plaintiff attempts to argue that even if the Requests for Admissions are deemed
admitted there remain questions of fact regarding the formation of a contract. Plaintiffs
oversimplified analysis focuses upon particular sections of the April 29, 2009 letter from
Defendant to Plaintiff. What Plaintiff fails to recognize that is that he bears the burden of proof
on each of the elements necessary to form a legally enforceable contract. As explained in
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Defendant's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, deemed admitted
Requests for Admissions 1 through 7 conclusively establish Plaintiffs failure to address the
necessary elements to form a legally binding employment agreement. As such, there are no
remaining questions of fact. Plaintiffs breach of contract claim fails as a matter of law.
Plaintiffs forth argument simply makes reference to yet another motion Plaintiff has
filed—Plaintiffs Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions. Defendant will respond to this
motion in a separate brief.
Plaintiffs remaining arguments respond to Defendant's effort to obtain summary
judgment on all of Plaintiff s tort claims and claims for exemplary and punitive damages, all of
which, in their present iteration, are prohibited by various sections of the Governmental
Immunity Act of Utah. Plaintiff has filed a motion to amend his prior pleadings, seeking to
name one of Defendant's former employees and an independent contractor as additional parties
and charge them with the particular torts and claims for exemplary and punitive damages that
Plaintiff inappropriately asserted against Defendant. However, if the deemed admitted Requests
i
for Admissions stand, this motion too will fail since many of the deemed admitted Requests for
Admissions defeat the required elements of these tort claims. Defendant will address the
propriety of Plaintiff s proposed First Amended Complaint as part of its memorandum in
opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint.
In the final paragraph of Plaintiff s Argument section he seems to be arguing by his
statement "because [Plaintiffs] cause [es] of action [and claims for infliction of mental anguish

'

and negligent misrepresentation are] based in contract" that none of his tort claims are barred by
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Reply Memorandum
in Support ofOCR,
Plaintiff
Motionerrors.
for Summary Judgment
Machine-generated
may scontain
V o n FlPn P i l ^ n f v

V i c t o Q/•»!-. ™ 1

i

the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah because they are all based in contract. Plaintiff fails to
cite any legal support for this assertion. The most direct counter to this assertion is found within
the very section of the Governmental Immunity Act cited by both parties: Utah Code Ann. §63G7-301(5)(b).3 Subsection (b) was cited by Defendant for its express prohibition of claims for
injuries resulting from infliction of mental anguish. However, the immediately preceding type of
prohibited claim in this subsection is "interference with contract rights." What are Plaintiffs tort
causes of action if they are not claims alleging interference with alleged contractual rights? Had
the Legislature intended the result suggested by Plaintiff this reservation of immunity of claims
for "interference with contract rights" would not be part of the Governmental Immunity Act.
CONCLUSION
Having thoroughly countered all of the arguments in Plaintiffs Opposition
Memorandum, Defendant requests that the Court grant its Motion for Summary Judgment.
DATED this A 2 ^ r i a y of August 2010.
SNOW JENSEN & REECE

in

Tyson "C Horrocks
Attorneys for Defendant Vista School

J

In the Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant quoted subsection (b)
instead of referenced subsection (a). Plaintiff perpetuated this mistake in his Memorandum in Opposition. The
Governmental Immunity Act's preservation of immunity for injuries resulting from infliction of mental anguish and
interference with contract rights is found in subsection (b).
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the QS

day of August 2010,1 caused a true and correct copy

of the REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be delivered via first class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the
following:
Bryan T. Adamson, Esq.
THE JUSTICE FIRM, L.L.C.
205 East Tabernacle, Suite 2
St. George, UT 84770
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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FIFTH DISTRICT COURT - ST, GEORGE
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 20, 2010
9:39 A.M.
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THE COURT: We have motions hearings in the case of
Steven Van Den Eikhof versus Vista School. Mr. Adamson,
Mr. Hardman are here, and you have someone.
MR. HARDMAN: Yes, Your Honor.
Asherman.

This is Carl

He's a member of the board of trustees of Vista

School.
THE COURT: Okay.

I received a binder with

2-and-3/8 inches of material.

I have read it all.

spent quite a bit of time on it.
that repeated for me.

I have

I don't need to have any of

I will, I think, go straight to the

motions for summary judgment with anything additional either
attorney may have to say on the motions for summary judgment.
The plaintiff's motion was filed first so,
Mr. Adamson, go ahead.
MR. ADAMSON:

Your Honor, plaintiff's motion, if

you've read everything, you have our argument essentially.
It's just that a contract —

as a matter of law, the Court

should decide whether or not a contract existed. We've got
this letter that essentially —

not essentially, expressly
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says offer of employment on it. My client signed it,
returned it, and we argue that that is, as a matter of law, a
contract, and it's really that simple.
The defendant has argued that it's an offer to
offer, and we could go into that, but as a matter of law, I
think the Court can decide whether or not a piece of paper
that says this is an offer of employment was indeed an offer
of employment.
THE COURT: Okay.

On the defendant's motion for

summary judgment, Mr. Hardman, anything you want to say on
that?
MR. HARDMAN: Well, before doing so, are you
interested in — we've, I think, thoroughly briefed all the
responsive issues to the plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment, but in regards to —

just as a point of

counterargument, in regards to this —
THE COURT:

Is this something I've read about quite

a lot?
MR. HARDMAN:

Okay.

I think it probably is, so

I'll spare you the recitation of those details.
The plaintiff's motion for —

excuse me, the

defendant's motion for summary judgment is premised in two
parts, as the Court knows. First has to do with the
defective plaintiff's failure to respond to the request for
admissions, and then the second component to the defendant's
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motion for summary judgment has to do with numerous defects
in the plaintiff's pleadings as it relates to governmental
immunity statute.
I think we've very clearly and succinctly addressed
all of those issues, and if the Court, as indicated, has
thoroughly reviewed all that material, I don't know that we
could offer anything further to elicit any of the things that
we've set forth therein.
THE COURT: Okay. Anything that needs to be said
on any of the other motions, the motion to strike an
affidavit, the motion to amend or withdraw admissions, motion
for sanctions, motion to amend the Complaint. Anything that
I haven't seen on that?
MR. ADAMSON:

One thing that you haven't seen, Your

Honor, is that for some reason they were not getting the mail
we sent, we were not getting the mail they sent. We have
since started sending everything to their law firm via
certified mail.

Since then we've had no problems, so I don't

know what the problem was with USPS before that, but since
we've sent everything return receipt requested, everything
has arrived. And this really hinges on the entire motion for
summary judgment as to whether or not that magically arrived
in my office, even though no one saw it, no one clocked it
in, it never hit the file, and we didn't see it until the
motion.

So that's the only thing that's not been briefed
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that since we began sending everything certified return
receipt, we seem to have no problem with the mail.
MR. HARDMAN:

If I may, Your Honor, one matter I

would like to bring to the Court's attention has to do with
plaintiff's motion to amend the Complaint.

Since this was

the plaintiff's motion, I opposed it, and in reply to the
defendant's opposition memorandum, the plaintiff made
reference to the case of Bingham v Roosevelt.

I didn't

notice whether the Court brought — whether Your Honor
brought the binder in with you, but if you have —

do you

have the binder with you?
THE COURT: No, I'm not going to risk work-related
injuries by trying to bring that in here.
MR. HARDMAN:

If I may, Your Honor, I think it

bears some clarification.

In plaintiff's reply memorandum,

they suggest that this continuing torts theory, as discussed
in the Bingham versus Roosevelt case, has application to toll
the statute of limitations in reference to the governmental
immunity issues.

It's our position, Your Honor, that that is

a misapplication of Bingham v Roosevelt, and because it was a
reply brief in which they identified this case for the first
time, we did not have the benefit of a response.
But I would point out I think it's very important
to note that from the text of this case as it discusses the
application of the continuing tort doctrine as a vehicle to
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essentially not really toll the statute of limitations
because compliance with the governmental immunity statutes
notice requirement is a jurisdictional issue.

It's not a

statute of limitations issue as we've discussed in our
briefing.
And so that distinction bears clarification because
it was in my opinion overlooked by the defendant in its reply
brief to our opposition memorandum.

Again, the plaintiff

seems fixated on the analysis it's a statute of limitations
issue which it is not.

It's jurisdictional, meaning the

Court doesn't even have jurisdiction to receive the pleading,
determine whether it's appropriate, et cetera, if those
threshold requirements were not met.
But in regards to the suggestion whether it's as a
statute of limitations issue or a jurisdictional issue that
somehow this continuing tort theory has application, if the
Court wants to make a note of Paragraph 57 of the case —
this is a new case just recently handed down by the Utah
Supreme Court in May 2010 so it has the paragraph references.
Paragraph 57 states as follows. And, of course, in this
particular case it was a continuing tort was a trespass claim
occasioned by a municipality's accessing of an aquifer which
reduced the pressure of water available to agricultural users
in the area.
And so that was the context of the continuing tort,
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but the application of this doctrine or the analysis of its
application, the Supreme Court said the following. Again,
this is Paragraph 57.

"In the context of nuisance and

trespass, we have considered conduct to be the continuing
tort where the conduct may be discontinued at any time.
Furthermore, we have classified a trespass as either
permanent or continuing by looking solely at the act
constituting the trespass and not at the harm resulting from
the act."
In the plaintiff's reply memorandum, he
acknowledges that the act was the alleged repudiation of this
purported contract.

That would be the act itself. And yet

he suggests in his briefing that his subsequent efforts to
try and sell property to cover the loss of wages or efforts
to find replacement employment or things of that nature
constitute repeated torts by the school. That's not what
this case stands for, nor is that the proper application of
the continuing tort doctrine.
Again, the court says, "Because multiple trespasses
give rise to multiple causes of action, the statute of
limitations begins to run anew with each act. Accordingly,
we have characterized the trespass as permanent when the act
or acts of trespass have ceased to occur."
It's our position that the act —

the tort act at

issue was the alleged repudiation of the contract. That
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occurred in or about early to mid-August of 2009,

Everything

that followed thereafter was the alleged harm that resulted
from the act. Those harms are not continuing torts, and so I
would encourage the Court to apply that analysis as very
clearly explained by Utah Supreme Court in this Bingham v
Roosevelt City case and disregard that analysis in the
plaintiff's reply memorandum because it's inapplicable to the
arguments at issue.
THE COURT: Okay, thank you. Anything on that
point?
MR. ADAMSON:

Just this, Your Honor.

That's only

an alternative argument, albeit it's in a gray area regarding
continuing torts. The fact of the matter is is whether or
not the plaintiff properly —

if the plaintiff's Complaint

was properly pled in the first place with particularity.
It's our argument is there's no need to amend the Complaint
in the first place, but in the alternative if the Complaint
is found deficient then we would argue that we should be able
to amend.
THE COURT: Weil, as I said, I spent quite a lot of
time on this and made, as I usually do as I review motions,
made my handwritten notes and then made some summary notes of
rulings on the various motions, and I tried to put these in
the order that they should come in order to relate to each
other appropriately.
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Starting with the defendant's motion to strike the
plaintiff's affidavit, the defendant is correct; the
affidavit was not timely filed; yes, it does need to be filed
with the memorandum it supports, A memorandum in support of
summary judgment is required to include citations to
affidavits, discovery matter or other relevant materials.
Can't refer to relevant materials that don't exist until
later.

It has to be filed with the memorandum it supports.
The affidavit also is largely inadmissible under

Rule 56(e) for the reasons described in the defendant's
memorandum.

The plaintiff cites little or no authority for

the arguments regarding striking the affidavit. The motion
is well-taken, and the motion to strike is granted.
The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on
breach of contract fails to meet the requirements of Rule 7,
specifically Rule 7(c)(3)(A).
affidavit.

There's no supporting

There are exhibits referred to but not attached

and I still haven't seen.

They're not otherwise provided.

The plaintiff's motion also quotes from a
long-outdated version of Rule 56(a) and quotes language that
existed some years ago but is not current.

There's no

citation to relevant materials to support seven out of the
plaintiff's 15 statements of fact. Unfortunately the motion
and the reply include very unprofessional language used by
plaintiff's attorney, mocking opposing counsel and accusing
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opposing counsel of fabrication.
In the face of that, all of those things, the Court
could not possibly determine there are no genuine issues of
material fact or that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. That finding or conclusion must be
reached in order to grant summary judgment, so the
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied.
The plaintifff s motion to amend or withdraw
admissions comes next. The supporting memorandum is a bit
thin.

The opposing memorandum is very thorough with an

extensive analysis of the Langeland case and the application
to the situation.

The opposing memorandum correctly

demonstrates that the plaintiff's motion is insufficient for
consideration.

The plaintiff failed to introduce evidence by

affidavit or otherwise of specific facts showing any
admissions to be untrue.
The Langeland case is interesting to me in that it
follows through the thought process that we all have when we
first read what is said in rules about the amendment and what
is said in prior cases about the amendment, and those
standards are not just simply lightweight, superficial
things, but they actually have some substance to them. And
the plaintiff's memorandum simply does not show the specific
facts regarding any admissions being untrue that is required
to show that the presentation of the merits would be aided by
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granting the motion.
Again, the plaintiff's reply memorandum is highly
unprofessional asserting that the defendant, quote, either
made a mistake or tried to trick plaintiff, end quote. And
then finally at that late point, the plaintiff tried to
include affidavits.

That's improper in a reply memorandum.

The party's not allowed to meet its initial burden by waiting
until opposing counsel responds and then doing what was
required in the first place.
I find the preponderance of the evidence as
distinguished from argument and insult shows that defendant's
discovery was served on plaintiff's attorney by mail.

The

evidence in that regard is just much too clear to ignore.
The evidence proves conclusively that the plaintiff received
the discovery request by e-mail, and the appellate courts
have held that having this notice of this sort, not
specifically e-mail but clear actual notice that discovery
requests were present, gave the plaintiff a duty to respond
in some way, to do something other than just nothing. But
the plaintiff failed to respond in any way, and according to
the long-standing rule, the request for admissions are deemed
admitted.

Consequently plaintiff's motion to amend or

withdraw admissions is denied.
On the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the
defendant has 32 statements of fact all from the request for
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admissions, and according to Utah law those are conclusively
proved.

Plaintiff's opposing memorandum attempts to dispute

two of the asserted facts which, if done correctly, might
prevent summary judgment.

The plaintiff, however, offers no

citation to any affidavit, any discovery or any other
relevant materials. The plaintiff also includes more
unprofessional language. No genuine issue of material fact
appears in regard to defendant's motion for summary judgment.
On the legal issues, the governmental immunity both
because of substance and because of plaintiff's failure to
file the —

I won't say it's meaningless, but the meager $300

undertaking I conclude bars the plaintiff's claims. The
defendant's analysis of those issues is very thorough. The
response to it is just simply insufficient.

I conclude

defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and so
the defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.
As to the plaintiff's motion for sanctions,
plaintiff cites no legal basis for sanctions to be
considered.

The defendant introduces the plaintiff to the

Rule 11 basics, and the plaintiff's reply is the most
disappointing and unprofessional yet.

In all capital

letters, quote, plaintiff's counsel knows for a fact that
discovery was not sent, end quote.

I find that to be an

outrageous, unprofessional statement with no basis in fact.
And ironically, as I once suggested in an article I
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wrote for the bar journal, filing a motion for sanctions like
this would actually give the defendant a valid motion for
Rule 11 sanctions.

I'm not doing it today on the Court's own

initiative under Rule 11(c)(1)(b) only because I've spent
enough time on this matter already.

Plaintiff's motion for

sanctions is denied.
Plaintiff's motion to amend the Complaint is the
last of those. Neither party explained the statute of
limitations issue sufficiently for me to understand.

There

was a lot of language suggesting a knowledge of things that I
didn't know about. Dates were thrown around; I didn't know
what those dates related to.

I just didn't find a complete

explanation of the statute of limitations issue. However, it
appeared to me that the Amended Complaint would include
claims on which the Court has now granted summary judgment,
and it is not clear that the plaintiff has complied with the
Governmental Immunity Act in order to file a Complaint in the
first place.

I'd have to be persuaded the plaintiff had done

that to approve any amendment. And from the discussion today
it appears that the continuing tort doctrine is probably
inapplicable to this case. Under all those circumstances,
the plaintiff's motion to amend the Complaint is denied as
proposed.
Did I miss any motions that were in the binder that
you expected a ruling on?
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MR. HARDMAN: Weil, the only other motion that's
now moot is the stipulated motion to suspend our case
management plan pending the outcome of these proceedings, but
if the Court's ruling on the summary judgment — or
defendant's summary judgment, I think that's now rendered
moot.
THE COURT:

I thought the same thing when I got to

that down at the bottom of the binder.
MR. HARDMAN:

If I may, Your Honor, in response to

the Court's observation that neither party very clearly
explained the statute of limitations issue as it relates to
plaintiff's motion to amend the Complaint, I think the reason
the defendant didn't focus on that is because that really
isn't the analysis. As I explained and as discussed
previously, it's a jurisdictional issue, and the plaintiff
has acknowledged that the only writing that could conceivably
come within the ambit of what might qualify as a governmental
immunity notice of claim was this November 20, 2009, letter,
and that letter doesn't — that letter very specifically
states that the plaintiff is bringing its claims against
Vista School and no one else.
And for that reason — the plaintiff's Amended
Complaint seeks to add additional parties and claims against
those additional parties, and if that notice was technically
insufficient, which it was, then it's a jurisdictional issue,
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not a statute of limitations issue, and that Complaint is
barred.
And because we're now well beyond the one-year time
period from the accrual of the action the plaintiff contends
gives rise to a claim, any subsequent attempt to file an
Amended Complaint against any employee of Vista School or to
add any new claims against any employee or against Vista
School, except for potentially a contract claim that the
Court has now since determined with its ruling on the summary
judgment wouldn't apply, would be insufficient.
So I don't know if that clarification helps, but I
think the Court has before it all the necessary materials to
determine that not only is plaintiff's motion to amend the
Complaint denied as proposed, but it's denied, period.
There's no — plaintiff has no continuing ability to bring
claims against any employee of Vista School or any new claims
against the school itself.
THE COURT: Well, I understand the argument, but
I'm not going that far for that reason. When I said it
wasn't clear the plaintiff had complied with the Governmental
Immunity Act, that's what I was talking about, and I'd have
to be shown that there was jurisdiction of the court in order
to entertain any Complaint and at this point an Amended
Complaint.
As to the statute of limitations, there again, I'm
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not sure when particular things are supposed to have happened
and how the time would be calculated from there.

It was just

a little bit light in that analysis, and now I understand
why, but I'm not making any decision about any future
Complaint. We'll just have to deal with that if it were
filed —

if something else were filed because I don't think I

have enough of a basis to rule out any possible future
Complaint.

If you are correct in terms of the timing, then

that would be a relatively short-lived matter as well, but I
can't determine that now.
MR. HARDMAN: Okay.
THE COURT: Mr. Adamson, I know you practiced in
Texas, and that may be part of the reason for some of the
language.

I hear it most often when we have attorneys who

have moved here from Las Vegas, because I know in Las Vegas
this kind of extravagant figure-pointing sort of language is
just the currency of the day apparently.

It just doesn't fly

in Utah, and I know it's argument, and it's heat of the
moment and that sort of thing, but it never helps.
MR. ADAMSON:

I never write in the heat of the

moment, and your criticism is well-taken.

The whole thing

was, you know, whether or not this discovery was ever sent,
and albeit an e-mail saying it will be sent.
(Multiple speakers.)
MR. ADAMSON:

— taking word for it, so it got very
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frustrating.
THE COURT: As I understood it, it was attached to
the e-mail.
MR. ADAMSON:

It totally was, but I never opened

it.

He said it would follow in the mail.

it.

I just don't do that.
THE COURT:

Why open it, print

I guess the answer why is the Supreme

Court and the Court of Appeals have both said, well, you
know, if you knew there was discovery, you better do
something about it.

It seems a little harsh rule to most of

us, but that's what they said.
MR. ADAMSON:

— dichotomy of don't use the

Dallas, Texas, language but take opposing counsel's actions
as Dallas, Texas.

In other words, they may be trying to stab

you and you have to protect yourself. Whether that was the
case or not, I don't know, but we never got it. And I
apologize.

Criticism is well-taken.

I'll calm down in the

future.
THE COURT: Okay, thank you. Appreciate all the
effort that's been put into this.

It gave me a headache, but

that's what it takes.
MR. ADAMSON:

I would like to know off the record

did Your Honor find that there was a contract?
THE COURT: No but that's only because for summary
judgment purposes I'm really only looking to see if that
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MR. ADAMSON: Not for summary judgment.

the face of the four corners, off the record completely.

4

THE COURT:

I didn't even see it.

5

attached.

6

you attached a copy of it later.

MR. ADAMSON:

I think

or the briefs rather.

Did the Court not get our notice of

errata with the affidavits for that?

11

THE COURT: No, I didn't. But there again, the way

12 I that —
13

It was attached to something later on.

as an exhibit to our motions —

9
10

It wasn't

MR. HARDMAN: We attached the April 29 t h letter

7
8

Just on

this is something that you need to understand.

The

way that I apply summary judgment is according to the rules

14 I as I read them.

I understand that that's not going to be

15

your experience everywhere.

In particular if you go to the

16

Court of Appeals, heaven only knows what their rules

17

regarding summary judgment are.

18

particular now retired judge at the Court of Appeals

19

making —

I have decisions by one

essentially making fact findings in the course of

20 | an appellate decision. Another one saying, oh, no, we'd
21

never do that; we stick to the record presented to the trial

22 court.
23

I don't know what the rules are up there.

It's a

24

bit like when I began practice here in 1981, and we all had

25

to try to just figure out what Judge Burns's rules were for
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summary judgment because you couldn't read them anyplace.
You just had to kind of sit in court and listen and watch and
say, oh, I know what I have to do now.

That was really

frustrating.
To me, summary judgment is pretty straightforward,
and the motion and the supporting materials have to be all in
order so that there's a record right there, because what
we're doing with summary judgment is eliminating somebody's
proverbial day in court, and I feel like if we're going to do
that, then we've got to stick to that rule. And that's where
the appellate court decisions really bother me because in the
one case that I will never tire of talking about, the Pugh
versus Dozzo case, if you want to read that you'll read about
a suicide note and read that the suicide note was partially
typed and partially handwritten, and they thought that was
just wonderful evidence that, you know, turned the case.
The problem is when the motion was filed, there was
no suicide note, and I looked through all the materials that
they filed for the motion, and there was no suicide note in
them.

And so when I wrote my decision, I wrote that the

parties keep talking about a suicide note.

It is not in

evidence before the court. Well, all of a sudden it pops up
in the Court of Appeals' decision.
attorneys —

So I ordered those

and the one who had won the motion for summary

judgment had lost her attorney by then —

I ordered them to
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1

come back and show me where these statements of the Court

2

Appeals were in the record that they presented for their

3

motion, and the party that prevailed on the appeal candidly

4

admitted it wasn't anywhere. The note wasn't there.

5

attached as an exhibit to a deposition transcript that was

6

not in this court's file, but it got included in the record

7

on appeal.

It was

8

And so in my view the Court of Appeals — we all

9

know it's their law clerks — went dumpster diving through

10

that file to try to find anything they could and ignored the

11

standards of Rule 56 and Rule 7. And I had a correspondence

12 I discussion with that judge about that, resulting in the next
13

time she wrote a decision her saying we'd never look at

14 I anything that wasn't presented to the trial court.
15

little late now, isn't it.

16
17

It's a

So that's where I get my understanding of summary
judgment practice; that the motion with the supporting

18 materials has to show no genuine issue of material fact. By
19

the same token, the reply only has to properly dispute one

20 I stated fact, one essential fact, there's no summary judgment,
21

That's what we have trials about when there's legitimate

22 disputes.
23

And so formally, the form of things is extremely

24

important for summary judgment.

In fact, I did —

25

outline of summary judgment procedures that I've revised
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i /r-J r*
nnn
r,7
r*,-.s-]->-^ nA-i-^r
TIT Q/l
ion

MARY BETH COOK, CSR, RPR

(435)

868-1075

I have an

20

090503847

10-20-10

several times. Now I'm going to speak to the Matheson Inn of
Court in February on the same subject because it's been four
or five years that just lays out this is what you have to
have at this point in time. And it is very formal, and it's
formalistic almost, but that's because we're doing such an
extraordinary thing. We're saying there's not even any need
to wait for trial.

If this is what the case is, then the

Court can determine this now.
And I really hesitate doing that anytime it comes
up, and I spent quite a lot of time looking to see, yeah, but
isn't there a disputed issue of fact here?

In fact, I

remember one time somebody else was arguing the motion when
Judge Eves came in, and he had a stack of courtesy copies
like yours, and he came in and plopped it on the bench and
said, Do you mean to tell me there's not one genuine issue of
fact in there?

And, you know, but that's the standard.

there is, it's out.
out.

If

If there's a question on the law, it's

But that's why the memoranda have to be so clear

because that's all that we get. That's all the record we
have, and so if we're going to eliminate somebody's day in
court, somebody's trial, it will have to be pretty lockstep
in compliance with that rule.
And Rule 7 and 56 have not been totally
coordinated.

They've been mostly, but 56 was all there was

for many years, then Rule 7 was a great deal revised, and
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that's where we ended up with the real —

the other

requirements for it. So 56 gives kind of broad standards and
one particular specific standard; 7 gives the details. You
have to just kind of read those together to get it.
And so when I get to the point of a judgment —
motion for summary judgment as to a contract matter, if I
can't determine there's no genuine issue of fact, then that's
as far as I go.

I don't go any farther and say, well, but

what if. And so that's why I'm saying I didn't really read
the contract to interpret it to determine whether it was a
contract.
MR. ADAMSON:

Because we didn't cite to it in our

memorandum in opposition.
THE COURT:

It wasn't cited.

MR. ADAMSON:

It was a lawyer issue, not a fact

issue.
THE COURT: Weil, I can't tell you if there's a
fact issue.
MR. ADAMSON:

Right, but for you —

THE COURT: But there was a form issue. The form
wasn't there.

I'm done. And I practiced —

in my private

practice I practiced summary judgment as much as possible
because it's a great way to save money and get things
resolved.

And most of the time I would do discovery with the

idea that everything I want discovery is material for a
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summary judgment motion, so requests for admissions are first
in line and interrogatories. Requests for documents all you
do is get paper, and, you know, they're not too much use for
summary judgment, but in summary judgment context the
discovery is critical.
There are also other things you just have to gather
along the way about summary judgment affidavits, like the
Webster versus Sill case which is one that says if a party
has taken a position under oath one direction, he can't file
a contradicting affidavit and create an issue of fact with
himself essentially, and that's happened once in a while.
You know, there will be a deposition taken, somebody says
something clearly on the record.

Then when summary judgment

motion comes up, he files an affidavit that says something
different.

That's one of the things —

it's not in the rule,

but it's in a critical case, and you just have to know that
you can't get away with doing that.
I don't know.

I've gone through different

attitudes towards summary judgment, because at times I have
concluded that there's no point in even considering summary
judgment in the trial court because we don't know what the
appellate courts will do. And if we don't know what they're
going to do, why do we waste our time with it here. It
becomes a —

it's not an appeal.

It becomes some sort of a

de novo motion hearing if they're not going to pay attention
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to the standards of the rules. And in their defense I think
one of the things that happens on appeal is there will be new
attorneys because somebody is mad about what their attorney
did or didn't do, so it will be new attorneys, and nobody
brings it up. Nobody points out to the appellate court, wait
a minute, this was not even presented to the trial court.
You can't consider that; it's not part of an appeal; this is
something new.
And they understand that.

I mean, the appellate

courts are good at that when there's a trial.

If you were to

have a trial and then on appeal say, oh, but there was a
witness we couldn't get to trial, but here's his affidavit.
No, we don't keep adding to the evidence on appeal. They'd
never allow that, but they do on summary judgment.
And, in fact, in about 2004 I think it was I did
just a casual e-mail survey among all the district court
judges in the state, and I just had three or four little
questions about summary judgment, what's your experience.
And one of them was when you see an appellate court decision
on summary judgment, do you find the facts have changed
significantly from when you heard about them. And several
judges responded to that, and one judge from Salt Lake who
never agrees with me on anything and we do not pass the time
of day even, don't even acknowledge each other, she wrote
back and said, yes, it happens all the time.
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So it's been a common experience, but I think our
only hope to use summary judgment for the good purposes it
has is to follow the rule and make it clear why we're
following the rule in motions and memoranda, in my rulings,
and then what ever the appellate court does I guess it's up
to them.
MR. ADAMSON:

Can I ask this about the 300? Does

the file have record that that was paid?
THE COURT:

I think it does, yes.

MR. ADAMSON:
lose a case?

Is that a bond that's given once you

Can my client get that back?

THE COURT:

I don't know what that is.

MR. ADAMSON:

I don't either.

MR. HARDMAN:

It's supposed to be for the benefit

of the governmental entity to recover some portion of costs
expended in defending the case.
THE COURT: That will go a long way.
what to tell you.

I don't know

I don't know if there will be a motion to

forfeit it or a motion to return it or what.

I don't know.

Then I'll find out.
MR. HARDMAN:

Do you intend to issue the written

orders, or do we need to prepare them?
THE COURT: You'll need to do them.
MR. HARDMAN:

That will be fine.

I figured that

would be the case but wanted to make certain of that.
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I wish I had time for that, but I

don't.
(Whereupon, the proceedings concluded at
10:16 p.m.)
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241

Request to Submit Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on Breach of Contract
Claims

08/25/2010

259

Request to Submit for Decision Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment Oral
Argument Requested

08/25/2010

261

Affidavit in Support of Response to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment

08/25/2010
08/26/2010
08/27/2010

263
265
317
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Complaint
Acknowledgement of Waiver of Service
Answer - VISTA SCHOOL A UTAH PUBLIC CHA
Plaintiffs Initial Disclosures

Certificate of Discovery to Defendants Initial Disclosures
Discovery Plan and Case Management Order
Certificate of Discovery (Defendant's First Set of Requests fro Admissions,
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents to Plaintiff)
Certificate of Service (Defendant's U.R.C.P. 68 Settlement Offer)
Motion for Summary Judgment on Breach of Contract Claims and Supporting
Memorandum - STEVEN VAN DEN EIKHOF
Motion for Summary Judgment - JAMES G HARDMAN
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment
First Amended Complaint
Motion to Amend Complaint - BRYAN T ADAMSON
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Complaint
Motion for Sanctions - BRYAN T ADAMSON
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Sanctions
Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions - BRYAN T ADAMSON
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions
Memorandum in Response to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment
Notice of Errata (Motion to Amend Complaint)
Amended Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions
(Certificate of Mailing Corrected)
Amended Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Complain (Certificate of
Mailing Corrected)

Motion for Summary Judgment on Breach of Contract Claims and Supporting
Memorandum (Amended to Include Exhibits) - BRYAN T ADAMSON

Defendants Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions

Defendants Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Amend or Withdraw
Admissions
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Document Title

Entry Date
08/30/2010
08/30/2010

Page Number
369
384

Motion to Strike Affidavit of Steven Van Den Eikhof DTD August 25 2010 (aka
Affidavit in Support of Response to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment) JAMES G HARDMAN

09/02/2010

387

Reply to Defendants Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Amend or Withdraw
Admissions

09/07/2010

413

Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum

09/07/2010
09/07/2010
09/07/2010
09/07/2010
09/07/2010
09/08/2010
09/10/2010

418
420
423
429
431
433
438

Request to Submit for Decision (Defendants Ex Parte Motion to File Overlength
Reply Memorandum in Support of Def Motion for Summary Judgment)

09/16/2010

441

Memorandum in Response to Defendants Motion to Strike Affidavit

09/20/2010
09/20/2010
09/20/2010
09/20/2010

443
448
450
452

Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motion to Strike Affidavit of Steven
\/an Den Eikhof Dated August 25 2010 (aka Affidavit in Support of Response to
Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment)

09/24/2010

454

Request to Submit for Decision (Defendants Motion to Strike Affidavit of Steven
^an Den Eikhof dated August 25 2010) (Oral Argument Requested)

09/24/2010

460

NOTICE OF PENDING MOTIONS

10/05/2010
10/19/2010

462
464

10/20/2010
11/19/2010
12/16/2010
12/16/2010
12/16/2010
12/16/2010

467
468
470
476
491
498

Drder Granting Defendants Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Steven Van Den
Eikhof Dated August 25 2010

12/16/2010

506

Drder Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint

12/16/2010
12/29/2010
12/29/2010
12/20/2010

514
525
527
530

Defendants Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint
Request for Oral Argument-Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on Breach of
Contract Claims

Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions
Reply to Defendants Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions
Request to Submit Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions
Request to Submit Plaintiffs Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions
Reply to Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Amend Complaint
Request for Oral Argument (Plaintiffs Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions;
Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions; and Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint)

Amended Request to Submit Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions
Amended Request to Submit Plaintiffs Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions
Amended Request to Submit Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on Breach
of Contract Claims

Stipulated Motion and Order to Suspend Discovery Plan and Case Management
Drder
MOTIONS HEARING
_etter from Counsel Re Submitted Orders
Drder Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions
Drder Granting Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment
Drder Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions
Drder Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on Breach of Contract
Claims

Jotice of Intent to Appeal
Jotice of Appeal
Jotice of Entry of Orders
/lar 18, 2011
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Letter from Supreme Court and Order transferring to the Court of Appeals
(#20110037)
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532

TRANSCRIPT for Hearing of 10-20-2010

01/26/2011

536
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"Relating to" and "related to" include pertaining to, referring to, or having as their subject
matter, directly or indirectly, expressly or impliedly, the subject matter of a specific request.
The word "and" includes the disjunctive, and "or" includes the conjunctive as necessary
to attain the broadest response.
Singular masculine pronouns have a nonrestrictive meaning and are used to refer to you
or a person, as defined herein, of either gender.
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS
ADMISSION NO, 1:

Please admit that the letter from Vista School, dated April 29,

2009, attached hereto as Exhibit 1 (hereafter referred to as the "Vista Letter"), is a true and correct
copy of the letter you received from Vista School.
ADMISSION NO. 2:

Please admit that the Vista Letter contained conditions that

had to be fulfilled before you became an employee of Vista School.
ADMISSION NO. 3:

Please admit that the Vista Letter states that it did not serve

as a formal employment agreement.
ADMISSION NO. 4:

Please admit that the Vista Letter states that you will

complete a "hiring process."
ADMISSION NO. 5:

Please admit that the Vista Letter provides that you had to

sign a Salary Agreement to formally accept employment from Vista School
ADMISSION NO. 6:

Please admit that you did not sign a Salary Agreement with

Vista School.
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ADMISSION NO, 7:

Please admit that you were given an opportunity to sign a

Salary Agreement on or about August 14, 2009.
ADMISSION NO. 8:

Please admit that the Vista Letter did not state you would

receive additional compensation in the form of educator salary adjustments in excess of the stated
base salary of $34,622.
ADMISSION NO. 9:

Please admit that the Vista Letter did not state that you would

receive additional compensation beyond the stated base salary of $34,622 for attending
professional development and training days.
ADMISSION NO. 10:

Please admit that you did not sign the Salary/Wage

Agreement - Teacher attached as Exhibit F to your Complaint (hereafter the "proposed Salary
Agreement").
ADMISSION NO. 11;

Please admit that the proposed Salary Agreement provided

for a salary of $35,626 after calculating in the Educator Salary Adjustments and compensation for
attending professional development and training days.
ADMISSION NO. 12:

Please admit that the total amount of compensation in the

proposed Salary Agreement exceeded the total amount of compensation stated in the Vista Letter.
ADMISSION NO. 13:

Please admit that you were compensated by Vista for the

training referenced in Paragraph 25 on your Complaint.
ADMISSION NO. 14:

Please admit that you were not required to attend the Vista

reception as alleged in Paragraph 32 of your Complaint.
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ADMISSION NO. 15:

Please admit that you were not required to attend the Vista

teacher training as alleged in Paragraph 34 of your Complaint.
ADMISSION NO. 16:

Please admit that you were not required to attend the Vista

teacher training alleged in Paragraph 38 of your Complaint.
ADMISSION NO. 17:

Please admit that you never signed nor were presented with

any written agreement wherein you were offered 100% medical insurance benefits at no cost to
you as alleged in Paragraph 39 of your Complaint.
ADMISSION NO. 18:

Please admit that you never signed nor were presented with

any written agreement that stated that you would receive $1,389 a month in benefits as alleged in
Paragraphs 21 and 69 of your Complaint.
ADMISSION NO. 19:

Please admit that you were not present to teach class at

Vista School on the first day of the 2009-2010 school year.
ADMISSION NO. 20:

Please admit that you did not teach any classes during the

2009-2010 school year.
ADMISSION NO. 21:

Please admit that you did not perform any work at the

direction of Vista School following the first calendar day of the 2009-2010 school year.
ADMISSION NO, 22:

Please admit that no person associated with Vista School

ever told you that you were "terminated" as alleged in Paragraph 53 of your Complaint.
ADMISSION NO. 23:

Please admit that the 2009-2010 school year was the first

year of operations for Vista School
ADMISSION NO. 24:

Please admit that you never held the position of classroom

Digitized by the Howard
W. First
Hunter
Law
Library,
J. Reuben Clark
Law School,
BYU.
Defendant's
Set of
Requests
for Admissions,
Interrogatories
and
Machine-generated
OCR,
may contain
errors.
Requests for
Production
of Documents

teacher at Vista School.
ADMISSION NO. 25:

Please admit that you never held the position of mentoring

teacher at Vista School.
ADMISSION NO. 26:

Please admit that you have not had a teacher evaluation

administered by Vista School.
ADMISSION NO. 27:

Please admit that you did not receive a satisfactory rating or

above on a teacher evaluation administered by Vista School.
ADMISSION NO. 28:

Please admit that you exchanged written communications

with employees or representatives of Vista School regarding your compensation prior to actually
receiving the proposed Salary Agreement.
ADMISSION NO. 29:

Please admit that you exchanged verbal communications

with employees or representatives of Vista School regarding your compensation prior to actually
receiving the proposed Salary Agreement.
ADMISSION NO. 30:

Please admit that you were made aware on or before

August 2, 2009 that Vista School's proposed Salary Agreement would be less than you had
originally believed.
ADMISSION NO. 31:

Please admit that you had communications with a Vista

School employee regarding your base salary on or before August 2, 2009.
ADMISSION NO. 32:

Please admit that George Washington Academy never

presented you with a written offer of employment for the 2009-2010 school year.
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